Post-Image

Bibliography

Our investigation is firmly lodged between several on-going international debates and draws on the work produced in those contexts. Here you can find a list of key references.

References

  • Audi, R. 2013. Moral Perception. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

  • Baumgarten, A. 1970. Aesthetica. Hildesheim & New York: Georg Olms. First published 1750.

  • Beardsley, M. C. 1981. Aesthetics, Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism. London: Hackett.

  • Bergqvist, A. & Cowan, R. 2018. Evaluative Perception. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Blum, L. A. 1994. Moral Perception and Particularity. Cambridge University Press.

  • Breitenbach, A. 2013. “Beauty in Proofs: Kant on Aesthetics in Mathematics”. European Journal of Philosophy. 23(4), 955-77.

  • Budd, M. 2003. ”The Acquaintance Principle”. British Journal of Aesthetics. 43(4), 386-92.

  • Christensen, D. 2007. “Epistemology of Disagreement: The good news”. The Philosophical Review. 116(2), 187-217.

  • Copp, D. 2001. “Realist-expressivism: A neglected option for moral realism”. Social Philosophy and Policy, 18(2), 1-43.

  • Costello, D. 2013. “Kant and the Problem of Strong Non-perceptual Art”. British Journal of Aesthetics. 53(3), 277-98.

  • Dancy, J. 2010. “Moral Perception”. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume. 84(1), 99-117.

  • Davidson, D. 2001. Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective: Philosophical Essays. Vol.3. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • De Clercq, R. 2002. “Two Conceptions of Response-dependence”. Philosophical Studies, 107(2), 159-177.

  • Dorsch, F. 2013. “Non-inferentialism about Justification: The case of aesthetic judgements”. Philosophical Quarterly. 63(253), 660-82.

  • Driver, J. 2006. “Autonomy and the Asymmetry Problem for Moral Expertise”. Philosophical Studies, 128(3), 619-644.

  • Eaton, M. 1994. “The Intrinsic, Non-Supervenient Nature of Aesthetic Properties”. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism. 52, 383-97.

  • Enoch, D. 2011. Taking Morality Seriously: A defense of robust realism. Oxford University Press.

  • French, C. 2013. “Perceptual Experience and Seeing That P”. Synthese, 190(10), 1735-1751.

  • Fricker, E. 2006. ”The Epistemology of Testimony”. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Vol. 61, 57-83.

  • Friday, J. 1998. “Hume's Sceptical Standard of Taste”. Journal of the History of Philosophy, 36(4), 545-566.

  • Goldman, A. 2006. ”The Experiential Account of Aesthetic Value”. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism. 64(3), 333-42.

  • Haukioja 2007. “How (Not) to Specify Normal Conditions for Response-dependent Concepts”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 85(2), 325-331.

  • Hopkins, R. 2001. “Kant, Quasi-Realism and the Autonomy of Aesthetic Judgement”. European Journal of Philosophy. 9(2), 166-89.

  • Hopings, R. 2006. “How to Form Aesthetic Belief: Interpreting the Acquaintance Principle”. Postgraduate Journal of Aesthetics. 3(3), 85-99.

  • Hume, D. 1987. “Of the Standard of Taste”. Essays: Moral, Political and Literary. Liberty Classics. First published 1757.

  • Kant, I. 2000. Critique of the Power of Judgment. Guyer, P. & Matthews, E. (ed. & transl.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. First published 1790.

  • Kieran, M. 2010. “The Vice of Snobbery: Aesthetic knowledge, justification and virtue in art appreciation”. Philosophical Quarterly. 60(239), 243-63.

  • Kölbel, M. 2002. Truth Without Objectivity. London: Routledge.

  • Lackey, J. 2008. Learning from Words: Testimony as a Source of Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Lackey, J. 2010. “What Should We Do When We Disagree?”. Oxford Studies in Epistemology. 3, 274- 93.

  • Levinson, J. 2002. “Hume’s Standard of Taste: The real problem”. Journal of Aesthetics and art Criticism. 60(3), 227-38.

  • Levinson, J. 2005. ”Aesthetic Properties”. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 79(1), 211-27.

  • Lewis, D. 1989. “Dispositional Theories of Value”. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, 63, 113-137.

  • Lyons, J. 2015. “Unencapsulated Modules and Perceptual Judgment”. The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception. Zeimbekis, J. & Raftopoulos, A. (eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Maddy, P. 1980. “Perception and Mathematical Intuition”. The Philosophical Review 89: 163- 196.

  • McAllister, J. W. 2005. “Mathematical Beauty and the Evolution of the Standards of Mathematical Proof”. The visual mind II, (ed.) Emmer, M. Massachusetts: MIT Press, 15-34.

  • McDowell, J. 1985. “Values and Secondary Qualities”. Honderich, T. (ed.) Morality and Objectivity, Routledge: London.

  • McGonigal, A. 2006. “The Autonomy of Aesthetic Judgement”. British Journal of Aesthetics. 46(4), 331-48.

  • McIver Lopes, D. 2014. Beyond Art. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Meskin, A. 2004. “Aesthetic Testimony”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 69(1). 65-91.

  • Meskin, A. 2006. “Solving the Puzzle of Aesthetic Testimony”. Knowing Art: Essays in Aesthetics and Epistemology. Kieran, M. & McIver Lopes, D. (eds.). Dordrecht: Springer.

  • Millar, B. 2014. “The Phenomenological Directness of Perceptual Experience”. Philosophical Studies, 170(2), 235-253.

  • Moran, R. 2005. “Problems of Sincerity”. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 105(1), 325- 45.

  • Mothersill, M. 1984. Beauty Restored. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Nguyen, T. 2017. “Philosophy of Games”. Philosophy Compass. 12(8).

  • Nanay, B. 2013. Between Perception and Action. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Nanay, B. 2016. Aesthetics as Philosophy of Perception. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Olson, J. 2011. “Getting Real about Moral Fictionalism”. Oxford Studies in Metaethics. 6, 181. Parsons, G. 2006. “Freedom and Objectivity in the Aesthetic Appreciation of Nature”. British Journal of Aesthetics, 46(1), 17-37.

  • Robson, J. 2013. “Appreciating the Acquaintance Principle: A reply to Königsberg”. British Journal of Aetshetics. 53(2), 237-45.

  • Robson, J. 2014. “Aesthetic Testimony and the Norms of Belief Formation”. European Journal of Philosophy. 23(3), 750-63.

  • Robson, J. 2015. “Norms of Belief and Norms of Assertion in Aesthetics”. Philosopher’s Imprint. 16(5), 1-19.

  • Schafer, K. 2011. “Faultless Disagreement and Aesthetic Realism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 82(2), 265-286.

  • Schaffer, J. 2006. “The Irrelevance of the Subject: Against subject-sensitive invariantism”. Philosophical Studies. 127(1), 87-107.

  • Schellenberg, S. 2014. “The Epistemic Force of Perceptual Experience”. Philosophical Studies, 170(1), 87-100.

  • Schellekens, E. 2006. “Towards A Reasonable Objectivism for Aesthetic Judgements”. British Journal of Aesthetics, 46(2), 163-177.

  • Schellekens, E. 2007. “The Aesthetic Value of Ideas”. Philosophy and Conceptual Art. Goldie, P. & Schellekens, E. (eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Shelley, J. 2004. “The Problem of Non-perceptual Art”. British Journal of Aesthetics. 43(4), 363-78.

  • Sherry, D. 2009. “The Role of Diagrams in Mathematical Arguments”. Foundations of Science, 14(1), 59-74.

  • Sibley, F. 1965. “Aesthetic and Non-aesthetic”. The Philosophical Review.74, 135-59.

  • Sliwa, P. 2012. “In Defense of Moral Testimony”. Philosophical Studies. 158(2), 175-95. Stokes, D. & Matthen, M. & Biggs, S. (eds.). 2014. Perception and Its Modalities. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Todd, C. 2004. “Quasi-Realism, Acquaintance and the Normative Claims of Aesthetic Judgement”. British Journal of Aesthetics. 44(3), 277-96.

  • Tropman, E. 2012. “Can Cornell Moral Realism Adequately Account for Moral Knowledge?”. Theoria, 78(1), 26-46.

  • Watkins, M., & Shelley, J. 2012. “Response-Dependence about Aesthetic Value”. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 93(3), 338-352.

  • Zangwill, N. 2001. The Metaphysics of Beauty. Cornell: Cornell University Press.